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About 10 years ago the Singapore Government real-ized that entrepreneurial spirit was lacking in itsgeneral population. These conclusions were con-
firmed by an empirical survey, the Global Entrepreneur-
ship Monitor (GEM), an annual assessment of the nation-
al level of entrepreneurial activity. The paternalistic and
authoritative approach of the government contributed to
the general population’s averseness to participating in risk-
oriented ventures.
Removing impediments to entrepreneurship is a key
challenge for the government and the business sector if the
island republic is to maintain its national competitiveness.
This article explores the various initiatives taken by the
government to stimulate risk-taking and attempts to ascer-
tain if the various measures can be used as key factors to
strengthen the inherent cultural values that stimulate the
entrepreneurial spirit.The observations can serve as a use-
ful tool for academics and managers in recognizing the
cultural traits that influence and help foster entrepreneur-
ial tendencies.
Singapore is a tiny island state with no natural resources save
a hard-working small population of immigrants. It is located
in Southeast Asia between the nations of Malaysia and
Indonesia (see Figure 1) and has thrived as a trading and ship-
ping center since its founding by the British East India
Company’s Sir Stamford Raffles 188 years ago. It covers mere-
ly 650 square kilometers including a few offshore islands. Its
deepwater port served the British well in shipping raw mate-
rials from the region to Europe (Bhasin and Low 2002).
The state was granted self-government by the British in
1959, and in 1963 it joined the Federation of Malaysia only to
be ousted in 1965 when it became an independent republic.
Since then, the country has risen to become “one of the
world’s most prosperous countries with strong international
trading links (its port is one of the world’s busiest in terms of
tonnage handled) and with per capita GDP equal to that of
the leading nations of Western Europe” (CIA: World Factbook
2006) Singapore is now an international city with an
extremely dense population,a largely corruption-free govern-
ment, a skilled and educated workforce, and a successful free
economy where regional and more than 7,000 multinational
companies are major investors. Per capita income has
jumped in 40 years from US$500 to US$25,000, a growth of
50 times multiple. However, certain sectors remain “dominat-
ed by government-linked companies” (U.S. Department of
State 2006).
Since its independence, Singapore has been ruled by one
party, the People’s Action Party (PAP), which has adopted a
highly controlled form of governance. The government has
been involved in regulating and engineering almost every
facet of society. Many have attributed Singapore’s success to
this autocratic form of public policy and governance.
Singapore’s “miracle” has been somewhat marred by the
realization that entrepreneurial activity in the nation had
been on the decline for decades. This discovery was fully
authenticated by an early Global Entrepreneurship Monitor
(GEM) survey in 2000, which lists Singapore very low in
Total Entrepreneurial Activity by Country category (see
Figure 2).
This article sketches the social and economic environ-
ment in Singapore, which may have contributed to stunting
entrepreneurial activity, and outlines the efforts made by the
Singapore government to foster an entrepreneurial culture
through a series of programs aimed at increasing the citi-
zens’ propensity and willingness to take risks. The annual
GEM survey serves as an excellent tool to confirm if the pro-
grams have been successful.This case of Singapore can serve
as a starting point for managers and academics in investigat-
ing the various cultural traits that need to be stimulated to
encourage entrepreneurial activity.
Background: Singapore Inc.
Since independence, the Singapore government has deliber-
ately pursued a policy of active participation in the economy
by setting up “government-linked” companies (GLCs) some
of which are monopolies.
Most of these companies were established in the 1960s
and 1970s to help facilitate building of infrastructure and to
support economic development. In the 1980s and 1990s, this
was further expanded to privatization of government depart-
ments and statutory boards (Singapore Department of
Statistics 2001).The stated rationale for this strategy “was to
compensate for the lack of private sector funds or expertise”
(Ramirez and Tan 2003).
Investment was in key sectors such as manufacturing,
finance, trading, transportation, shipbuilding, and services.
The listing in Table 1 (from Ramirez and Tan 2003) is not
exhaustive but is indicative of the extent of the government’s
involvement.
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As early as 1998, the U.S. Embassy in Singapore published
a report in which it estimated that GLCs accounted for 60
percent of the domestic economy (Restall 2000).This devel-
opment has been viewed as being largely unprogressive
based on the argument that “GLCs tend to do better than pri-
vate sector firms because their institutional relationship with
the government gives them special advantages in terms of
access to funds, tenders, and opportunities; consequently,
they have closed large areas of the economy to the private
sector and stifled entrepreneurship”(Ramirez and Tan 2004).
The conclusion that Ramirez and Tan draw in their paper
for the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is that though the
Singapore government claims that there is no state interfer-
ence in the GLCs, that they do not receive special privileges
or concealed subsidies, and are allowed to fail if they lose
money, it was found that GLCs were “rewarded in financial
markets with a premium of about 20 percent” (Ramirez and
Tan 2004).
The 2006 Index of Economic Freedom sponsored by the
Heritage Foundation and the Wall Street Journal reports that
“Singapore received 22.75 percent of its total revenues from
state-owned enterprises and government ownership of prop-
erty” (Index of Economic Freedom 2006).
By far the biggest commercial vehicle of the Singapore
government is Temasek Holdings, which was established in 
1974 and now has a diversified portfolio of S$129 billion
(approximately US$97.75 billion). The firm is involved in
telecommunications and media, financial services, property,
transportation and logistics, energy and resources, infrastruc-
ture, engineering and technology, as well as pharmaceuticals
and biosciences. The company proudly claims that total
shareholders return since inception is 18 percent com-
pounded annually (Temasek Holdings 2006). The New York
Times recently reported that Temasek companies account for
almost 30 percent of the economy (Arnold 2006).
The company is 100 percent owned by the Singapore
Ministry of Finance. The Chief Executive of Temasek
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Figure 1. Singapore Is a Tiny Nation-State
Located in Southeast Asia 
Source: CIA.The World Factbook, 2006.
Figure 2. Total Entrepreneurial Activity 
by Country 2000 
Source: Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 2000. Singapore
Country Report,Center for Management of Innovation and
Technopreneurship (CMIT), National University of Singapore
(NUS), September 25, 2001.
Table 1. Government Investment 





Keppel Hitachi Zosen Manufacturing
Keppel Marine Industries Manufacturing
NatSteel Multiindustry
Neptune Orient Lines TSC
SembCorp Logistics TSC
Singapore Airlines TSC
Singapore Petroleum Co. Manufacturing




1. TSC = Transport, storage, and communication
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(appointed in 2002) is Ho Ching,who is married to Lee Hsien
Loong, the newly elected prime minister of the country and
son of Singapore’s founding father Lee Kuan Yew.Forbes mag-
azine cited Ho Ching as number 30 on their List of 100 Most
Powerful Women in the World in 2006 (MacDonald and
Schoenberger 2006).
The second investment arm of the Singapore government
is the Government Investment Corporation (GIC), which
invests Singapore’s foreign reserves totaling more than
US$129 billion. Established in 1981, it operates as a global
fund manager on behalf of the Singapore government. The
board is headed by the founding father of Singapore, Lee
Kuan Yew as chairman.The other members of the board are
all present and past government ministers and include the
current prime minister, Lee Hsien Loong, “the same safe
hands who run the other government-owned companies that
make up as much as 60 percent of Singapore’s economy”
(Ellis 2004).
On September 6, 2006, Bloomberg reported that the GIC
manages the world’s seventh-largest currency reserves
(Whitley and Lo 2006). Its portfolio includes real estate, pub-
lic markets, and special investments.The GIC does not pub-
lish the value of its assets and details of its investments are a
state secret.“The fund does not have to file annual reports,
justify profit-and-loss statements, or even report to
Parliament” (Ellis 2004). The Singapore government claims
the secrecy is to ward off “potential speculative attacks on
the Singapore dollar because the foreign reserves are often
used to stabilize the national currency” (Ong 2003).
There have been many calls for the Singapore government
to reduce its participation in private enterprise as well as for
more transparency in its current involvement. The govern-
ment’s position however has remained that if Singaporeans
do not mind then foreigners should not question it. This is
coupled with the premise that government involvement is
necessary to foster growth. As recently as November 2006,
the founding father of modern Singapore, Mentor Minister
Lee Kuan Yew,defended Singapore’s financial secrecy in spite
of demands that they become more accountable.
In 2005 the IMF suggested that “Singapore should reveal
the financial performance of GIC” (Burton 2006a).The Asian
Wall Street Journal also noted that “if the economy is to be
freed up and if entrepreneurs are encouraged to take risks in
order to restore growth, full disclosure about the state’s stew-
ardship of the nation’s wealth is needed” (Restall 2000).The
leading Asian economic publication, Hong Kong’s Far East
Economic Review, reports that there is a price that
Singapore has to pay for its government-led economic model.
“Instead of nurturing a domestic entrepreneurial class with
its own vested interests, it [Singapore] has kept the com-
manding heights of the economy under the control of
Singapore Inc.” (Restall 2006).
Singapore Government’s Authoritarian
Approach
The World Bank has recognized that Singapore is a leading
component of the East Asian “miracle”(Richardson 1997).But
Singapore’s economic success has often been attributed to
the authoritarian or semiauthoritarian political (and econom-
ic) control exercised by the ruling party. The country has
been ruled by a single political party since independence
over 41 years ago.The preferred method of governance has
been to “maximize political cooperation and minimize con-
tention”(Richardson 1997).They have allowed for little or no
opposition in parliament. Opposition is considered to be dis-
ruptive and destructive.Very strict litigation results if anyone
utters what the government considers is “unacceptable” crit-
icism, and foreign journalists and their journals and newspa-
pers are sued for libel in Singapore courts, where the judg-
ment is invariably in the government’s favor.
The government exercises virtually absolute control over
most aspects of society. There is a clear and close relation-
ship between the judiciary, government, and the media. In
addition to a one-party government without opposition, the
state-linked broadcaster,MediaCorp,controls all free TV chan-
nels, and Singapore Press Holdings Ltd. publishes most news-
papers (Yeoh 2005).
The arrangement of GLCs and the GIC provide the
Singapore government and the “ruling PAP, a network of
power relations allowing it social control and political domi-
nance… the resources for social engineering, as well as for
political reward and punishment.The GLCs have tremendous
influence over all Singaporeans’ personal savings, housing,
job opportunities and business contracts” (Rodan 2004).
Christopher Lingle’s (1996) expose on Singapore’s
“authoritarian capitalism” contends that traditional institu-
tions have been used to impose restrictions on individual
freedoms in the pursuit of economic growth (Lingle 1996).
He argues that there has been little outcry against this, as
compared with “authoritarian socialism” when practiced by
totalitarian regimes due to the strong economic performance
exhibited in the Singapore case. The ruling party’s claim of
“Asian democracy” is more of a “phobocracy”—rule-by-fear,
with the insinuation that Western-style democracy needs to
be adjusted to suit the unique Asian milieu, which include
Confucian and other traditional values. Lingle had earlier
refuted these claims as attempts to “foster obedience”(Lingle
1995). This forced collectivism stifles individual innovation
by free-spirited entrepreneurs.
Singapore holds that authoritarian rule is necessary to pro-
mote political stability,which in turn would lead to rapid eco-
nomic development. Lingle, on the other hand, contends that
Singapore’s authoritarian rule has led to the “politicization of
commerce, distribution of economic and commercial privi-
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leges to trusted political supporters” and this has stifled the
emergence of home-grown entrepreneurs (Dorussen 1997).
Singapore’s authoritarianism is further exacerbated by “the
merging of state and party (ruling party the PAP which) has
been paramount in defining and sustaining the authoritarian
regime” (Rodan 2006).
Social Engineering Policy and Monopoly of
Talent 
To achieve national goals of economic development, main-
taining peace and harmony within the multiethnic popula-
tion, and cope with restructuring needs required to compete
in the global marketplace, the Singapore government set
about crafting a culture based on the top-down technocratic
model (Haley and Low 1998). The restructuring of society
meant intervention in all aspects of social life, and this was
based on the following core values as identified and continu-
ously modified by the government (Haley and Low 1998):
1. Community over self
2. Upholding the family as the basic building block of
society
3. Resolving major issues through consensus instead of
contention
4. Stressing racial and religious tolerance and harmony
5. Honest government
6. Compassion for the less fortunate
Singapore’s policymakers, under the patriarchal leader-
ship of Lee Kuan Yew, decided that Confucian way reflected
Asian values and would be the guiding light in structuring
the society to ensure survival and success in the changing
global environment.These values include the need for hierar-
chal structures and a compliant and docile society, an emula-
tion of the early Chinese society where the emperor was the
head of the nation (hence the Middle Kingdom—between
heaven and earth) and the father, the head of the family.The
assumption naturally was that these were shared beliefs of
the majority population which are of Chinese origin.
The fundamental precept of Confucian thought is that a
greater emphasis is placed at all times on the community
over the individual.The individual must be sacrificed over the
community. Lam Peng Er (2003) argues that there were four
motivations for the promotion of Asian values by Singapore’s
top Western-educated elites:
1. Propagation of these values would be less controversial,
less divisive, and more acceptable to Singaporeans of all
origins.
2. Promotion of these values would allow for soft-authori-
tarian rule and elites would conveniently wield power
by the consent of the masses.
3.The internalization of these values would inoculate
Singaporeans against the selfish, decadent, and individu-
alism of Western society.
4. Liberal democracy, while suitable to the West, may
divide, destabilize, and ruin Singapore.
The desirable Confucian values were
1. Deep respect for education and a competitive educa-
tion system
2.The best students become scholar-bureaucrats 
3.A meritocratic government whose political leaders are
also top scholars
4.Thrift and hard work 
5. Filial piety
6. A patriarchal society
7. A social contract between the benevolent and virtu-
ous rulers and grateful, respectful, and supportive
subjects
Naturally, promulgation of these meant that it served the
self-interest of the ruling elites in keeping them in power and
denying “political space to their domestic opponents” (Lam
2003). A consequence of this was the implementation of
numerous campaigns aimed at modifying social behavior: no
littering, speak Mandarin, display flags on national day, first
family planning and later procreate more,be courteous,plant
trees, smile more, stop smoking, say no to drugs, stay healthy,
etc. Strong legislation was enacted and implemented to
ensure compliance to these and Singapore carried the label
of being a “fine city.”
Singapore’s education system was originally geared to
meeting the needs of MNCs labor and skills requirements.
The technocratic model that requires students be “streamed”
into various specialized fields begins at an early age.
Educational pathways are stratified according to ability and
aptitude and this has resulted in the creation of a hierarchi-
cal and even elitist society (Ng 2005).The government’s con-
tention has been that streaming prevents waste by reducing
the drop-out rate.
The creation and promotion of a scholar-led bureaucracy
meant that the best and the brightest were recruited to enter
the government.Through the education system and compet-
itive examinations, a scholarship-awarding mechanism was
created to channel top academic brains for political, military,
and business leadership.This, in turn, led to the creation of an
elite ruling class and the monopoly of talent to serve the
needs of the government—and it kept the best from oppos-
ing the ruling party. Almost every cabinet minister and top
bureaucrat in the administrative service, military and police
commanders, the heads of statutory boards, and senior exec-
utives of government-linked companies have come from this
system (Seah 2006a).
The government considers the technocratic approach a
necessity to achieve national goals over a shorter period of
time without too much sidetracking and unnecessary exper-
imentation. Haley and Low contend that the technocratic
approach has resulted in Singaporeans losing its creativity
42 NEW ENGLAND JOURNAL OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP
4
New England Journal of Entrepreneurship, Vol. 10 [2007], No. 2, Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.sacredheart.edu/neje/vol10/iss2/6
and entrepreneurship that the nation so essentially needs
(Haley and Low 1998).
Chew and Chew’s (2003) research confirms that the
public sector has absorbed too much local talent, and this
has created a shortage in the private sector of innovative
and creative individuals capable of assuming this role.The
government needs to gradually release the most capable
human talent that it is presently hoarding (Chew and Chew
2003).
Risk Avoidance Tendency and Lack of
Creativity
Singapore has come a long way from being a labor-abundant
and capital-scarce struggling economy to a labor-scarce and
capital-abundant country. It has also progressed from its early
beginnings as a labor-intensive manufacturing base for inter-
national corporations to a high value-added services-based
center specializing in trading, transportation, finance, and
telecommunications.The country now needs to advance to
the next stage of innovation and creativity to remain compet-
itive (Chia 2005).
The then prime minister of Singapore, Goh Chok Tong,
acknowledged in his National Day address in 2002 that the
dearth of entrepreneurs is due to an overemphasis on rigid,
structured education, and this stifles creativity and risk-tak-
ing. He noted that studies in the United States have shown
that entrepreneurship is closely related with the level of cul-
tural vibrancy. Studies have also shown that the arts can help
individuals to become more creative in areas beyond the arts.
They are an important source of inspiration and a powerful
avenue for individual expression (Singapore Government
Press Release 2002).
Numerous reasons have been cited to explain the risk-
averse culture in Singapore.Low (2006) in his study of cultur-
al obstacles in growing entrepreneurship in Singapore lists
the following:
1.Young “Singaporeans remain cautious because of what
they have seen, growing up in a PAP dominant land-
scape.” The society was basically very compliant and
lacked a diversity of ideas.
2. Eighty-five percent of focus groups in the study felt that
the educational system had encouraged the learning of
knowledge and facts and not necessarily to be creative.
3. Singaporeans are too “left-brained and textbook orient-
ed” and were a “pampered lot” who had grown up in a
“cushy environment.”This made them less street-smart.
4.There was a “strong reliance on the government to do
things for people.” By force of habit people were led to
thinking that the government would be looking after
them.
5.The social culture considers failure as an embarrass-
ment. “Kiasusim is a bane; being kiasu worsens
Singapore’s entrepreneurial situation.” People are con-
cerned about the “face” or “standing in their own
group.” In other countries failure is more acceptable as
it is considered a process of learning.
A very recent debate highlighted the fact that
Singaporeans were good at academics but lacked street
smarts. They fall short on individual initiative and rely too
much on the government for help. Singaporeans, it was felt,
functioned well only as a group, not as individuals; they were
not capable of being nonconformist or of standing out above
the crowd.The fault, it was claimed, lay in years of political
and social conditioning by a top-down government, which
was efficient but paternalistic. Everything was so structured
that people did not need to fight for a living, and this blunt-
ed their ability to compete. One could keep the people’s
compliance by “keeping their stomach full and their mind
empty” (Seah 2006b).
Programs to Stimulate Entrepreneurship 
One key requirement for fostering an entrepreneurial culture
is the “removal of all barriers, particularly those created by
government or within its power to change, that block or dis-
courage people’s entrepreneurship” (Davis 2002).
In preparing for Singapore’s entry into the 21st century,
the government included the need to develop and foster an
entrepreneurial environment in its Master Plan, aptly named
‘SME21’—reflecting the efforts to stimulate high-tech small
and medium enterprises (SMEs) moving away from the earli-
er focus on MNCs and larger corporations. Earlier in 1999 it
had already launched the Technopreneurship 21 (T21) pro-
gram, which was designed to develop entrepreneurship
involving technology and innovation. An Economic Review
Committee was formed in December 2001 to develop the
necessary goals and strategies.
Singapore already had a pro-business environment but no
protection was accorded to small businesses and SMEs,
which naturally could not compete with larger and well-
established corporations (Tan 2003).
1. Start-ups and SMEs did not have adequate access to cap-
ital, though the financial sector was highly liberalized
and developed. Banks did not specifically focus on the
financial needs of smaller enterprises (Tan 2003).
2. No provisions were at hand to help entrepreneurs com-
pete in an environment of globalization, even though
Singapore had been ranked as the third most “global-
ized” country by A.T. Kearney/Foreign Policy Magazine
Index 2001 (Tan 2003).
3. Entrepreneurs felt that they were victims of overregula-
tion and the high costs of fees and licenses they were
required to comply with.
Consequently, a concerted effort was made by the
Singapore authorities to make the changes necessary to rec-
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tify the prevailing situation and a number of programs were
created.
In March 2000, a $10 million fund, called The Enterprise
Challenge (TEC), was set up to sponsor innovative proposals
that encourage creativity, innovation, and enterprise through
the provision and improvement of public services.
Entrepreneurship Assistance
Entrepreneurship Assistance provisions were created to
encourage and support local enterprises.The following agen-
cies were set up to promote entrepreneurial activity:
• Singapore Productivity Innovation and Growth (SPRING
Singapore) is the first stop for all entrepreneurs. Its
objectives are to promote a pro-business environment,
to champion industry development, to enhance enter-
prise capabilities, and to market access and opportuni-
ties. Services provided include standards and research,
patent information, current awareness, online informa-
tion, and a technical library.
• Enterprise One Singapore (EnterpriseOne) helps local
enterprises find the answers they need to start, sustain,
and grow their businesses.
• Singapore Entrepreneurs (SGentrepreneurs) is a public
site for entrepreneurs, venture capitalists, and business
plan competition organizers to “blog” about their expe-
riences in entrepreneurship and enterprise in
Singapore.
• International Enterprise Singapore (IE Singapore) is
responsible for taking enterprises abroad.
• Agency for Science and Technology Research (A*Star)
fosters scientific research and exploitation of technolo-
gy through incubators.
• Action Community for Entrepreneurship (ACE) is a
change agent in building a more pro-enterprise environ-
ment through: facilitating discussion and debate on the
regulatory framework; changing culture and mindset;
improving access to finance; and facilitating networking
and learning.
Entrepreneurship Incentives
Entrepreneurship Incentives were introduced to encourage
as well as remove obstacles that were preventing entrepre-
neurial activity. Incentives include:
• Tax exemption for start-ups. A special tax incentive was
introduced for start-ups in Singapore where they are not
required to pay tax on the first S$100,000 of chargeable
income (excluding Singapore franked dividends) for any
of the first three years of tax assessment falling within
year of assessment 2005 to 2009.
• Government tax incentive schemes. Such schemes
include the Double Tax Deduction (DTD) for Market
Development, a tax incentive offered to Singapore com-
panies to expand their overseas markets. Under this
scheme, companies are allowed to deduct twice the
amount of allowable expenses incurred in approved
projects from their taxable income. The DTD for
Overseas Investment Development Expenditure is a tax
incentive to encourage exploration of overseas invest-
ment opportunities, enhance their competitiveness, and
expand their operations in foreign markets.
• Government financing programs. Special schemes
include Local Enterprise Finance Scheme (LEFS), fixed
interest rate financing programs designed to encourage
and assist local enterprises to upgrade, strengthen, and
expand their operations; the Micro Loan Program (MLP),
a fixed interest rate financing program under LEFS
designed to help the very small local enterprises gain
better access to financing;Variable Interest Loan Scheme
(V-Loan), the Loan Insurance Scheme (LIS), which com-
plements the existing LEFS scheme. It provides an addi-
tional form of financing for SMEs by allowing more flex-
ibility for financial institutions to package attractive loan
facilities to SMEs based on their risk profile and the
Local Enterprise Technical Assistance Scheme (LETAS), a
scheme to help local enterprises defray the cost of
engaging an external expert for a limited period of time
to modernize and upgrade their operations. The
Overseas Enterprise Incentive (OEI) is designed to
encourage and support local enterprises to penetrate
new markets, explore new business opportunities, and
find new avenues for resources and technology. It allows
the qualifying companies to be exempted from taxation
for income arising from overseas investments, such as
dividends, royalties, interest income on shareholder
loans, incremental income from provision of support
services, and overseas project income. Finally, the
Revised Overseas Investment Incentive (OII) is a tax
incentive to help Singapore-based companies interna-
tionalize their operations. It is designed to encourage
Singapore-based companies to expand their operations
overseas by allowing them to defer taxes due from prof-
itable operations in Singapore.
• Economic Development Board (EDB) Start-up
Enterprise Development Scheme (EDB SEEDS). This
matched equity financing scheme is administered by
EDB to foster entrepreneurship and innovation activities
in Singapore. Start-ups can apply for SEEDS equity
financing when they are in their early stages. Every dol-
lar raised by a start-up from third-party investors will be
matched by EDB up to a maximum of S$300,000.Third-
party investors must put in a minimum of S$75,000
each. Both EDB and the third-party investors will take
equity stakes in the company in proportion to their
investments.
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• SPRING SEEDS. Nontechnology start-ups can apply for
SPRING SEEDS equity financing when they are in their
early stages. Every dollar raised by a start-up from third-
party investors will be matched by SPRING Singapore
up to a maximum of S$300,000. Third-party investors
must put in a minimum of S$50,000 cumulative. Both
SPRING Singapore and the third-party investors will
take equity stakes in the company in proportion to
their investments.
• Enterprise Investment Incentive (EII) Scheme. This
tax-incentive scheme allows investors in innovative
start-ups to deduct their investment loss amount
against their taxable income.With EII status, a start-up
can issue certificates to its investors for investment of
up to S$3 million. Investors with these certificates can
deduct any investment loss from their taxable income.
• Growth Financing Program. This program is designed
to support early stage, Singapore-based companies that
have the potential to become global competitive enter-
prises. Companies that have successfully completed
their product development with early customer trac-
tion can apply for equity financing for earnest overseas
market expansion activities through the Growth
Financing Program. Potentially, every S$2 raised by the
growth company from third-party investors will be
matched by S$1 from EDB, subject to a maximum of
S$1,000,000 under both the SEEDS and Growth
Financing Programs. Minimum investment from third-
party investors is S$500,000. Both EDB and the third-
party investors will take equity stakes in the company
in proportion to their investments.
• ACE’s Action Crucible for Financing Scheme. This
scheme is one of four action crucibles formed under
the Action Community for Entrepreneurship (ACE)
to improve SMEs’ access to financing, as part of the
impetus to foster greater entrepreneurship in
Singapore.
• Home Office Scheme. In this scheme, which is
designed to facilitate entrepreneurship, Housing and
Development Board (HDB) subsidized apartments can
be used as a home office and for business registration.
• Local Enterprise Technical Assistance Scheme. This
scheme will subsidize (up to 50%) the cost of hiring a
consultant to implement quality management and IT
systems (e.g., upgrading computer systems or ISO
projects).
• Patent Application Fund Plus. Designed to encourage
investors to patent innovations and commercialize their
inventions, this scheme offers help on covering some of
the costs of filing patent applications, such as profes-
sional and official fees and other related charges of
patent filing.
Entrepreneurship Education 
• National University of Singapore (NUS) Entrepreneur-
ial Center. This center offers a wide range of entrepre-
neurship courses for all undergraduate and graduate stu-
dents, to raise awareness and interest in entrepreneur-
ship among the NUS community and to conduct cutting-
edge research on key issues of entrepreneurship.
• Entrepreneurs Resource Center (ERC). The ERC pro-
vides specialized training programs that are tailor-made
for the business environment, as well as specially crafted
curriculum with a unique approach of integrating real-
life experience and case studies to refine business and
professional skills. ERC emphasizes a holistic approach
to encourage entrepreneurship
Amending Legislation that Stigmatizes
Failure
The arcane bankruptcy law was amended to encourage
entrepreneurship.Previously a bankrupt person could be dis-
charged only after paying most of his or her debt.The amend-
ments in 1995 and 1999 now allow the Official Assignee to
grant a discharge for debts below S$500,000 after three years
in bankruptcy.The amount of debt for which bankruptcy pro-
ceedings may be instituted was raised to S$10,000.The peri-
od during which a debtor can attempt to arrange a settle-
ment was raised to 45 days (Tan 2003).
Creativity and Innovation
Creativity and innovation are officially encouraged and fos-
tered with the introduction of several initiatives, including
the establishment of Creative Community Singapore, an ini-
tiative to provide opportunities for Singaporeans to express
their creativity and deploy their creative energy for commu-
nity benefit, to evolve a creative and connected community
where arts, culture, business, and technology converge to
empower and engage individuals.
Education Reform: Changing the Mindset
Singapore’s school system has been based on the concept of
meritocracy based on progress for those with ability and tal-
ent. For many, their future is determined at the age of 12
through the streaming exams.The result has been an empha-
sis on rote learning instead of critical thinking and the cre-
ation of a skilled,but compliant workforce.No opportunity is
given to slow learners or late bloomers. Parents have also
complained that the system stigmatizes some children early
on as failures (Burton 2006b).
Realizing that the education system needs to be adjusted
to allow for creative thinking as well as developing individual
abilities, the government is now trying to loosen up and
encourage creative thinking. A number of government meas-
ures are under consideration for implementation. A review
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committee recently concluded the need to change the mind-
set though the education system and recommended that
“Singapore’s education formula needs to move from unifor-
mity to diversity, from rigidity to flexibility, from conformity
to resilience, and from molding to empowering” (FitzPatrick
2003).
Changes need to be made to the exam and skill-oriented
system from focus on raw grades to fostering creativity and
innovativeness.The focus at all levels will now be to nurture
flexible mindsets, shift emphasis from teacher to learner, and
“transform from being just a productive society into a cre-
ative and risk-taking society” (FitzPatrick 2003).
Loosening Reigns to Foster
Entrepreneurship
The first step to dealing with any issue is recognizing the
problem. Singapore authorities have conceded that a dire
need exists for building a class of entrepreneurs who will
take the national economy to greater heights.This must main-
ly be done by the private sector but the government must
ensure that a climate for innovation,creativity, and risk-taking
exists. Many government leaders have stated that they are
willing to allow for dissent and reduction of controls.
Although much publicity was generated in the last 10 years
that this was going to be done, this has been mainly lip serv-
ice. Just recently in 2006 strong action was taken to prevent
protests at the World Bank and IMF meetings held in
Singapore and now new legislation is being planned to stop
Internet blogs from criticizing the government.
Net Result: Decrease and Increase in
Entrepreneurial Activity
The first GEM study (circa 2000) on the level of entrepre-
neurial activities in Singapore found it to be relatively low in
comparison with the other countries. Singapore was ranked
17 out of 21 on the total entrepreneurial activity (TEA)
index. The biggest impediment factors reported was the
value orientation of the people—preferring to work for larg-
er, established organization and fear of failure (GEM 2000).
The level of TEA improved substantially from 27 out of 29
nations in 2001 to 21 out of 37 nations in 2002, although the
total entrepreneurial propensity for 2002 declined in com-
parison to 2001. The two most important dimensions that
required improvement were social and cultural norms and
barriers to entry (GEM 2002).There was a further decline in
2003 and the main reason cited was the occurrence of the
SARS crisis, a viral infection that plagued most Southeast
Asian nations.“Cultural values” continued to receive low rat-
ings (GEM 2003).
The year 2004 saw the first major rise in TEA to 5.7 per-
cent from 5.0 percent in 2003. Singapore’s relative ranking
among the Organization of Economic Cooperation and
Development and East Asian countries improved slightly
from 14 of 21 in 2003 to 11 of 21 in 2004.
Improvements were reported in the following dimen-
sions:
1. Effectiveness of R&D transfer
2.Availability of capital
3. Government policy support
4.Access to physical infrastructure
5. Effectiveness of university, management education, and
training
Lower ratings for Singapore were in the following areas:
1. Effectiveness of primary and secondary education and
training
2. Rapidity of change in markets
3. Market accessibility
4. Social and cultural barriers
Singapore saw the highest increase in TEA in 2005 (up
from 5.7% to 7.2%) since it began participating in GEM in
2000. This increase outpaced that of the developed OECD
countries. The country was ranked 8 of 20. Improvements
were reported in the following dimensions:
1. Regulation and taxation system
2. Government policy support
3. Market accessibility
Areas in which Singapore was rated lower were:
1. Effectiveness of university education and training
2. Business service effectiveness
3.Availability of capital
4. Social and cultural barriers
Table 2 summarizes the changes in TEA and country rank-
ing for the years 2000 to 2005.
The constant lower ratings have been on social and cultur-
al barriers.The GEM 2001 Executive Report clarifies that this
is the most pressing issue and describes it as the “public’s
general attitude towards entrepreneurship.” In nearly every
country, this was found to be the greatest inhibitor to, or
enhancement of, entrepreneurship. GEM specialists agreed
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Table 2. TEA for Singapore 2000–2005
Year TEA (%) Country Ranking
2000 2.1 17 of 21
2001 6.6 27 of 29
2002 5.9 21 of 27
2003 5.0 14 of 21
2004 5.7 11 of 20
2005 7.2 8 of 20
Source: GEM 2000, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005.
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that a society’s negative posture with respect to creativity,
innovation, and change significantly reduces the number of
people engaged in starting new firms.The experts were also
clear that a culture that rewards risk-taking is more inclined
to support higher levels of entrepreneurial activity.
Willingness to accept failure also tends to be associated with
higher levels of risk-taking (GEM 2001).
Conclusion: More Can and Needs to be Done
The Economist (UK) ranks Singapore 84 among 167 coun-
tries in its 2007 Democracy Index.The index was developed
by The Economic Intelligence Unit (EIU). Singapore is listed
as a hybrid regime (mixture of authoritarian and democratic
elements) and ranks well below Finland (6), Malaysia (81),
Hong Kong (75),Taiwan (32), and Indonesia (65).The index
looks at 60 indicators across the five categories: electoral
process and pluralism, civil liberties, the functioning of gov-
ernment, political participation, and political culture
(Economist 2006).
In its Press Freedom Index, Reporters Without Borders
ranked Singapore 146 out of 167 countries surveyed for
press freedom. At the top of the list were Finland, Iceland,
Ireland, and the Netherlands while North Korea was last
(Press Freedom Index 2006).
It is clear from both reports that Singapore needs to do
much more in loosening its reigns of the population for them
to feel comfortable in a free society and become more will-
ing to take risks. The basic fact remains that in the current
Singapore business environment, the societal culture is anti-
thetical to the entrepreneurial spirit.
A business venture is a contradictory dynamics between
risk and risk awareness. A business that is purely based on
risk is an irrational undertaking.The ideal business venture is
one that reflects the following:
Risk > Risk Awareness 
Unfortunately in Singapore, the formula is reversed:
Risk Awareness > Risk
In the United States, it has been concluded that entrepre-
neurs do not consider themselves to be risk-takers. “They
have weighed the pros and cons and convinced themselves
that their so called risky idea isn’t that risky after all” (Boyett
2001). The paradox of risk is that you cannot afford not to
take it.“Nobody knows more about risk and how to live with
it than entrepreneurs” (Wacker 2001).
Risk averseness can be described as the unwillingness to
take risk due to the inherent fear of failure. It is an attitude
that promotes “playing it safe” in line with the oft-repeated
adage“you can’t do wrong if you do nothing!”which natural-
ly results in absolute minimization of any risk factors. In the
Oriental world, fear of failure is further reinforced by the
need to save “face.”
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Table 3. Democracy Index 2007: The Economist Intelligence Unit
Full Democracies Rank Flawed Democracies Rank Hybrids             Rank
Sweden 1 South Korea 31 Albania 83
Iceland 2 Taiwan 32 Singapore 84
Netherlands 3 India 35 Madagascar 85
Norway 4 Philippines 63 Lebanon 85
Denmark 5 Indonesia 65
Finland 6 Bangladesh 75
Luxembourg 7 Hong Kong 78
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Kreiser, Marino, and Weaver’s 2002 study empirically
proves that national culture has a direct and identifiable
impact on the level of entrepreneurial behavior. The study
utilized data from 1,070 firms in six countries to assess the
impact of national culture on entrepreneurial orientation.
The impact of culture was examined on two key dimensions:
risk-taking and proactive behavior. Their argument suggests
that by changing the “predominant cultural values in a given
society, policy makers can act as a catalyst to entrepreneurial
development” (Kreiser, Marino, and Weaver 2002).
Singapore’s success and weakness lies in this setup.
Entrepreneurship is a result of two interdependent factors:
1.A vibrant culture that is willing to take risk and values
the freedom of risk, and
2.A social system that channels and rewards the risk-tak-
ers so that society as a whole can benefit from the tal-
ent in due time.
A society that has traditionally focused attention on “con-
trol” rather than “free spirit”when confronted with the “new
economy” has extreme difficulty in reducing the controls
and increasing the free spirit. This is the key factor that
destroys entrepreneurial spirit in any economy, and is the
dilemma between “security” and “risk.” The choice for
Singapore is obvious.A truly entrepreneurial culture is built
around accepting failure as commonplace and risks contin-
ue to be taken because there is little to lose.This may not be
the case for Singapore where most citizens are simply too
well off and cozy.
Financial incentives, tax breaks, and infrastructure
improvements do certainly lead to increase in entrepreneur-
ial activity, as is the case in Singapore. But a desire for true
innovation, creativity, experimentation, and multiple oppor-
tunities in education cannot be realized until the state allows
civil society to flourish and avoids politicizing dissent (Tan
and Gopinathan 2000). As long as the Singapore government
is unwilling to allow natural forces to prevail, allow open
expression and free flow of ideas, and encourage out-of-the-
box thinking that will unveil the creative and innovative
energies that currently are dormant, only limited progress in
fostering an entrepreneurial culture can be expected.
Postscript
The GEM Survey for 2006 was released after completion of
this article but before publication date. Results released on
February 9, 2007 show that Total Entrepreneurial Activity
(TEA) went down from 7.2 percent in 2005 to 4.9 percent in
2006, placing Singapore 16 among the 22 members of the
OECD that were surveyed (Strait Times 2007).
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